In its judgment from 24 June 2026, Case No. 23 Cdo 2613/2025 (hereinafter as the “Decision”), the Supreme Court significantly revised its previous approach to determining the commencement of the statute of limitations for rights to contractual performance, the due date of which is, according to the parties’ agreement, left to the creditor’s discretion. It did so after being bound, during a new hearing of the case, by the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court expressed in its ruling, Case No. IV. ÚS 778/25.[1] The decision was issued in a case in which the parties, in accordance with standard business practice, agreed that the price would become due only upon delivery of the invoice or after the expiration of an agreed period following its delivery. Such agreements are common in business practice. The starting point of the statute of limitations is crucial, as it defines the time frame within which a claim may be enforced in court, if necessary. For these reasons, the conclusions reached in the Decision are of paramount importance.
According to the Decision, the three-year subjective statute of limitations for the right to contractual performance—the due date of which, according to the parties’ agreement, depends on a subsequent demand by the creditor—cannot begin to run before the claim becomes due; in the case at hand, this is the due date of the price invoiced. The mere fact that the creditor acquires the right to declare the claim due therefore does not trigger the commencement of the statute of limitations for the right to payment.
Current Practice
The Supreme Court has already addressed the issue of when the statute of limitations begins to run for claims whose due date can be triggered by a subsequent demand (invoice) in a Grand Chamber judgment dated 31 May 2023, Case No. 31 Cdo 3125/2022.[2] In this case as well, the contractually agreed price was not due until after the invoice was delivered, within a fourteen-day period. The Grand Chamber concluded at that time that the three-year subjective statute of limitations for the right to payment does not begin to run only upon the due date of the claim, but rather at the moment the creditor gained the ability to trigger the due date, for example, by issuing and delivering an invoice. According to this view, the decisive factor was not when the creditor issued the invoice, but when the creditor was first able to do so.
The consequence of this interpretation was that the subjective statute of limitations for the right to payment could begin to run even before the claim became due, and thus before the moment when it was possible to file a lawsuit for performance. It was precisely this consequence that became the subject of extensive scholarly criticism and, subsequently, constitutional review. According to Section 619(1) of the Civil Code, the statute of limitations for a right enforceable against a public authority begins to run from the date on which the right could first have been asserted. This moment is traditionally associated with the principle of actio nata, that is, the possibility of asserting a right through a lawsuit. However, in the case of a claim that is not yet due, such a possibility generally does not yet exist.
The practical implications for the business community were significant. Creditors were forced to monitor not only the due date of issued invoices but also the moment when their right to issue the invoice first arose. In many cases, it was therefore recommended to invoice immediately upon the claim’s creation to avoid “shortening” the statute of limitations. However, this approach does not correspond to standard business practice, as invoicing in the vast majority of cases does not take place immediately after the completion of performance; rather, one typically waits, for example, for the approval of handover reports, the rectification of minor defects, the completion of project milestones, or administrative confirmation of the scope of services provided, etc. Furthermore, in some industries, it is common to issue summary invoices for multiple partial performances.
It was precisely the application of these conclusions in the case now under review that the Constitutional Court rejected as unacceptably formalistic and incompatible with respect for the autonomy of the parties’ will. The Supreme Court therefore, after overturning its original ruling, ruled again and was obliged to respect the Constitutional Court’s legal opinion in the specific case. The Decision thus significantly extends the applicability of the conclusions of the Grand Chamber’s judgment, Case No. 31 Cdo 3125/2022, to cases in which the parties have agreed that a claim arises only upon invoicing or another demand by the creditor.
Factual Background and Court Proceedings
The Decision stems from a dispute between the contractor and the client regarding payment for the delivery and installation of plastic windows, doors, and transition elements. The price was billed in an invoice issued on 14 September 2017. The court of first instance relied on the due date stated on the invoice (as of 14 October 2017) and concluded that the creditor could have first asserted its right on 15 October 2017. However, the Constitutional Court also noted in its ruling that, according to the client’s confirmation, the agreed-upon 30-day due date did not expire until 18 October 2017. This difference was not decisive for the outcome of the case, as the complaint had already been filed on 13 October 2020 – that is, in both scenarios, before the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations calculated from the due date of the claim. The appellate court, on the other hand, citing the Grand Chamber’s judgment, Case No. 31 Cdo 3125/2022, linked the commencement of the statute of limitations to the moment when the creditor became entitled to invoice individual payments, and therefore dismissed the complaint.
Chamber 23 Cdo, to which the case was reassigned following the Constitutional Court’s annulment ruling, referred it to the Grand Chamber by a resolution dated February 10, 2026, pursuant to Section 20 of the Act on Courts and Judges. However, by a resolution dated 13 May 2026, case no. 31 Cdo 509/2026, the Grand Chamber remanded the case to the three-member panel. It stated that if a three-member panel is bound in a specific case by the legal opinion contained in the Constitutional Court’s annulment ruling, this fact alone does not constitute grounds for referring the case to the Grand Chamber, even if compliance with the ruling leads to a decision that differs from the Supreme Court’s previous case law. Chamber 23 Cdo therefore decided the matter itself in accordance with the binding legal opinion of the Constitutional Court.
The content of the contractual provision regarding the due date is decisive
The Constitutional Court, and subsequently the Supreme Court as well, proceeded from the premise that the determination of the performance period is part of the content of the obligation, which the parties may contractually regulate within the limits of the law. The parties may therefore agree that the debtor will be obligated to pay the price only after delivery of an invoice or other statement of account and after the expiration of the agreed-upon period. The admissibility of such an agreement stems primarily from the contractual autonomy of the parties. Section 1958(2) of the Civil Code generally governs situations where the parties have not agreed on a performance period and the creditor may demand performance immediately.
To determine when the statute of limitations begins to run, it will always be necessary to first interpret the specific contract. The decisive factor is whether, according to its terms, the claim arises only upon the issuance or delivery of the invoice, or whether the invoice merely records and settles a claim that had already become due earlier, for example, upon the completion and delivery of the work. The mere issuance of a tax document or statement of account cannot unilaterally alter the due date of an existing claim without a corresponding contractual provision. However, if invoicing is a condition of due date under the contract, the court cannot disregard this mechanism when assessing the statute of limitations and replace it with a hypothetical moment when the creditor could have issued the invoice for the first time.
The commencement of the statute of limitations cannot precede the due date and the possibility of asserting the claim in court
Another basis is Section 619(1) of the Civil Code, according to which the statute of limitations for a right enforceable against a public authority begins to run from the date on which the right could have been asserted for the first time. According to Section 619(2) of the Civil Code, it is also significant when the entitled person learned, or should have and could have learned, of the circumstances decisive for the commencement of the statute of limitations. The possibility of asserting a right for the first time is fundamentally linked to the principle of actio nata, that is, the moment when a lawsuit may be filed. As long as the claim is not due, payment cannot be successfully sought through a lawsuit.
Therefore, if, according to the parties’ agreement, the claim became due only upon delivery of the invoice and the expiration of the agreed-upon period, the statute of limitations for the right to payment could not have begun to run at the time when the creditor was merely able to issue the invoice. The decisive moment is when the contractually stipulated conditions for maturity were met and the creditor became aware of them or should have and could have become aware of them. In a typical case, the creditor will know the moment of maturity, since the creditor issues the invoice and delivers it to the debtor.
Distinguishing Between the Right to Performance and the Authority to Declare a Debt Due
The Decision cannot be interpreted as denying the existence of the creditor’s separate authority to declare a debt due. On the contrary, the Constitutional Court expressly stated that the parties agreed on a separate right of the creditor to declare the debt due, which is distinct from the creditor’s right to receive performance. The creditor may thus possess both the right to contractual performance and the authority to take a legal act that results in the realization of that right.
The essence of the new approach is the rejection of the conclusion that the mere moment when the creditor could have first exercised the right to declare the debt due would automatically trigger the commencement of the statute of limitations for the right to payment itself. Until the creditor issues the contractually stipulated demand and the claim becomes due, the right to payment generally cannot be successfully enforced in court. The statute of limitations for this right therefore cannot begin to run solely on the basis of a hypothetical consideration of when the creditor could have first triggered the due date.
However, the Decision does not address all issues related to the creditor’s right to determine the due date itself. In particular, it remains unclear whether and to what extent this authority is time-limited, whether it may itself be subject to a statute of limitations, and under what circumstances exceptionally late invoicing could constitute conduct contrary to the principle of good faith or an abuse of rights. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the commencement of the statute of limitations on the right to payment and any limits on the exercise of the separate authority to trigger the due date.
Practical Implications of the Decision
Previous case law required creditors, when managing receivables, to monitor not only the due date of the receivables but also the earliest date on which they could trigger the due date. In practice, this meant it was necessary to record, for example, the date of completion of the work, the provision of a service, or the fulfilment of another condition giving rise to the right to invoice—even if, under the contract, the price was not due until after the invoice was delivered and the agreed-upon period had elapsed.
This decision significantly mitigates this risk for contracts from which it is clear that the receivable becomes due only upon invoicing or another demand by the creditor. In such cases, the statute of limitations on the right to payment cannot begin to run merely because the creditor has already acquired the ability to issue an invoice. The starting point for the limitation period is, in principle, determined by the due date of the claim as contractually agreed, together with the creditor’s knowledge of the circumstances relevant to its enforcement.
However, no general rule can be inferred from the Decision according to which any creditor may arbitrarily postpone the start of the statute of limitations simply by delaying invoicing. First, it is necessary to assess whether invoicing constitutes a condition for maturity or merely an administrative act with no effect on a maturity that has already occurred. It may also be significant whether the contract ties the start of the payment period to the issuance of an invoice, its delivery to the debtor, approval of a work statement, or fulfilment of another condition. The Decision therefore underscores the importance of precisely defining payment terms in the contract and consistently documenting the delivery of invoices and other statements of account.
At the same time, the Decision confirms that, when assessing the statute of limitations, the court cannot disregard the contractual mechanism for determining the due date. The conclusions of the Decision may also be relevant in other situations where the maturity of a right is tied to a demand, notice of termination, or other unilateral legal act. However, the nature of the specific agreement will always need to be taken into account.
Conclusion
The Decision represents a significant shift in the assessment of when the statute of limitations begins to run for rights to contractual performance, the due date of which, according to the parties’ agreement, is to occur only upon a subsequent demand by the creditor. The Supreme Court, bound in this specific case by the legal opinion of the Constitutional Court, concluded that the statute of limitations for a right to payment cannot begin to run at the moment the creditor became able to issue an invoice if, under the contract, the claim was not yet due until the invoice was issued and delivered. What is decisive is the moment when the claim matured in the manner agreed upon in the contract and could be asserted in court for the first time.
The decision thus rests on the distinction between the right to performance itself and the creditor’s separate right to declare the claim due. The new conclusion is that failure to exercise the right to declare the claim due does not, in and of itself, trigger the commencement of the statute of limitations for the right to payment of a claim that is not yet due.
In practice, therefore, it will depend on whether invoicing constitutes a condition for maturity or merely an administrative statement of a debt that is already due. The contracting parties should therefore clearly stipulate what event triggers the maturity of the price, from what point the maturity period is calculated, and whether the issuance or delivery of the invoice is decisive.
At the same time, the question of the limits on a creditor’s authority to determine the due date remains open. Future case law will likely focus in particular on whether this authority itself may be subject to a time limit and when exceptionally late invoicing could conflict with the principle of good faith or constitute an abuse of rights. The development of case law therefore cannot yet be considered fully settled. Nevertheless, the Decision reaffirms the systematic link between the contractually specified due date of a claim, the possibility of successfully enforcing it in court, and the commencement of the statute of limitations for the right to performance.
If you have any questions regarding the due dates of claims and their statute of limitations, or regarding contract law in general, we at PEYTON legal are here to assist you.
[1] Judgment of the Supreme Court dated 24 June 2026, Case No. 23 Cdo 2613/2025, following the ruling of the Constitutional Court dated 3 September 2025, Case No. IV. ÚS 778/25.
[2] Judgment of the Supreme Court dated 31 May 2023, Case No. 31 Cdo 3125/2022.
Mgr. Martin Heinzel, partner – heinzel@plegal.cz
Mgr. Ráchel Kouklíková, junior lawyer – kouklikova@plegal.cz
23. 7. 2026